









































0Social Networks 54 (2018) 254–265
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Social  Networks
jo u r n al hom ep age: www.elsev ier .com/ locat e/socnet
eferrals  and  information  ﬂow  in  networks  increase  discrimination:  A
aboratory  experiment
ároly  Takácsa,∗,  Giangiacomo  Bravob, Flaminio  Squazzonic
MTA  TK “Lendület” Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Tóth
álmán u. 4., 1097 Budapest, Hungary
Department of Social Studies and Centre for Data Intensive Sciences and Applications, Linnaeus University, Universitetsplatsen 1, 35195 Växjö, Sweden
Department of Economics and Management, University of Brescia, Via San Faustino 74B, 25122 Brescia, Italy
 r  t  i  c  l e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 8 August 2017
eceived in revised form 19 March 2018
ccepted 22 March 2018
vailable online 30 March 2018
eywords:
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Referrals  and  information  ﬂow distort  market  mechanisms  of hiring  in  the labor  market,  but they  might
assist  employers  under  asymmetric  information  in  ﬁnding  better  alternatives.  This  paper  investigates
whether  an  impartial  information  ﬂow  between  employers  in  a cyclic  network  structure  could  generate
more discrimination  than when  no  information  is  exchanged  between  employers.  We  set up an artiﬁcial
labor  market  in which  there  was  no  average  quality  difference  between  two  categories  of workers.  We
asked  participants  to  play  the  role of employers  and  examined  the partiality  of  their  hiring  choices.  Results





quality  of workers  increased  discrimination  as  did the presence  of  referrals  from  workers.  Unexpectedly,
impartial  information  ﬂow  in  a cyclic  network  of employers  did  not  help  to  decrease  discrimination.  We
also showed  that  these  mechanisms  interact  with  and  subdue  each  other  in complex  ways.




Hiring discrimination means differential treatment of a certain
ocial category, based on category membership rather than indi-
idual merit. Differential treatment is recurrent in hiring choices
haracterized by asymmetry of information between the organiza-
ion and the applicant (Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Rooth, 2010).
iven that the true worker’s quality cannot be accurately predicted
uring hiring decisions, organizations might use recognizable traits
e.g., race and gender) ‘as inexpensive screening devices when hir-
ng for jobs, particularly skilled jobs, in the belief (correct or not)
hat race and sex status are, on average, related to productivity’
Kaufman 2002, p. 550). When there is no or little statistical basis
o distinguish the quality of members of different categories, fol-
owing recognizable traits cannot help to estimate the applicant’s
uality. In these cases, understanding why discrimination could
ersist is of paramount importance (Bertrand et al., 2005).
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Hiring decisions might reﬂect signals and information that chan-
nel through social networks. The important role of referrals in
particular is well documented for getting a job (Granovetter, 1973,
1974; Lin et al., 1981; Wegener, 1991; Elliott, 2001; Mouw, 2002;
Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006; Ponzo and Scoppa, 2010;
Fountain and Stovel, 2014). Many studies argued that getting a job
via referrals might distort the perfect market logic and replace mer-
itocratic processes in hiring (Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Petersen
et al., 2000; Tassier and Menczer, 2008). For instance, the extended
use of informal job search methods may  have a negative effect on
the rate of mobility from low status to high status jobs (McBrier
2003; 1212). If one of the groups has a better access to informal
job search, this is detrimental for the other group, as in the case of
referrals from the “old boys” network in a wide range of contexts
(Rogers, 2000; McBrier, 2003; McDonald, 2011; Bian et al., 2015).
Research concerning referrals highlighted how the hiring
mechanism could enhance inequality of employment and wages
(Montgomery, 1991; Krauth, 2004; Fontaine, 2008). Given that con-
tacts might be homophilous with regard to internal quality, the
extensive use of referrals lead necessarily to growing inequality
(Montgomery, 1991; Beaman and Magruder, 2012). Considering
that contacts are homophilous also with regard to social char-
acteristics that are uncorrelated with ability, research showed
that initial differences in the employment rate could result in
greater wage inequalities over time (Montgomery, 1991; Arrow
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nd Borzekowski, 2004). Exogenously provided job information
hat is passed on via network ties also enlarges small initial dif-
erences (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004, 2007).
A few studies looked at referrals (Engström et al., 2012; Beaman
nd Magruder, 2012; Beaman et al., 2013; Caria and Hassen, 2013;
ernandez and Greenberg, 2013) and other structural mechanisms
hat affect discrimination (see Olian et al., 1988 for an earlier meta-
nalysis). Our paper aims to study structural mechanisms that can
nﬂuence differential hiring practices experimentally.
The main advantages of the experimental methodology are that:
a) the hypothesized correlations can be tested unambiguously in
 fully controlled environment that excludes confounding effects
e.g., Smith, 1991; Roth, 1993; Webster and Sell, 2007); (b) genera-
ive relations can be identiﬁed; (c) replication of ﬁndings is possible
e.g., Chapin, 1932; Falk and Fehr, 2003; Willer and Walker, 2007;
ehr and Gintis, 2007; Bohnet, 2009; Falk and Heckman, 2009;
mith, 2010). It is worth noting that experimental studies might
elp us to identify mechanisms that can be empirically examined
n different contexts (Camerer, 2003; Ostrom, 2010; Ariely, 2008;
alk and Heckman, 2009).
Classical and recent small group experiments in social psy-
hology testiﬁed to the human tendency to discriminate unknown
artners based on category membership (e.g., Brewer, 1979, 1996;
ovidio et al., 2002; Fiske, 2009). Similarly, recent laboratory and
eld studies in economics and sociology conﬁrmed the existence of
iscriminative practices (e.g., Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999; Pager
t al., 2009; Jackson, 2009; Midtbøen, 2014; Agerström, 2014; Lee
t al., 2015). Some laboratory studies were able to isolate important
ehavioral effects and interactional inﬂuences in discrimination
e.g., Keuschnigg and Wolbring, 2015; Takács et al., 2015; Lane,
016).
Very few studies have tried to analyze factors related to social
apital in hiring experimentally (Godechot, 2016). This can be
xplained as it is very difﬁcult to depict the complex characteris-
ics of social capital in the laboratory, causing concerns of external
alidity. But exactly due to the complex nature of social capi-
al related processes, ﬁeld research cannot fully disentangle the
nformational aspects of social capital from other mechanisms on
iscrimination. By contrast, carefully designed experiments using
imple network structures can provide us a truly causal account by
ocusing on speciﬁc mechanisms inherent in the relational struc-
ure (Kosfeld, 2004; Willer and Walker, 2007; Gërxhani et al., 2013;
rashears and Quintane, 2015; Brashears and Gladstone, 2016). In
ur case, the experimental design can concentrate and rely on some
lementary and empirically relevant mechanisms that potentially
etermine discrimination in hiring. One of these mechanisms cov-
rs referrals coming from workers. Another one summarizes the
nformation ﬂow coming from other employers who are very much
n the same situation and have similar goals. Acquiring, passing on,
nd exchanging information between employers about employ-
es is very difﬁcult to trace in ﬁeld studies. Tags and signals that
haracterize workers are also multi-dimensional, some correlate
ith internal qualities and skills, while others do not. As our study
emonstrates, these mechanisms can be abstracted and used in
he lab. In order to allow for causal inference, our laboratory exper-
ments exclude concerns about strategic choices and endogeneity
n recommendations and referrals by design.
It analyzes hiring decisions in a controlled setting and is able
o reduce the high dimensionality of reality into a straightforward
odel.
Given the complexity of hiring choices in the labor market,
mpirical ﬁeld research is unable to test univocally whether refer-
als increase discrimination compared to a baseline case without
eferrals or not. Furthermore, it cannot be explored whether
eferrals make a difference also without any initial biases or alter-
atively, observed inequalities are there because of historical pathrks 54 (2018) 254–265 255
dependence. Besides, in existing ﬁeld studies, worker referrals and
information ﬂow among employers are considered jointly and their
impacts are hardly separated.
In order to overcome these empirical difﬁculties, following
Takács et al. (2015), we  have designed a labor market experiment
where participants (university students) were asked to play the
role of employers and select ﬁctive workers belonging to two cate-
gories. In our experiment, by excluding contextual effects and other
important aspects of the hiring process, we tested the net and the
joint effects of referrals, information ﬂow from other employers,  and
quality standards on discrimination.
Referrals have been deﬁned as recommendations for hiring by
workers in-house (Montgomery, 1991; Fountain and Stovel, 2014).
Referrals are naturally biased towards members of the in-group.
This characteristic feature has been depicted in our experimental
design. Information ﬂow has been conceptualized as an automated
process in a simple directed network of employers. This con-
ceptualization covers multiple mechanisms according to which
employers get to know the true qualities of workers employed
at connected ﬁrms; such as recommendation letters, information
exchange, and observations that take place as a result of estab-
lished contact between the organizations. Quality standards were
evaluation thresholds set up exogenously to determine whether it
is economical to keep workers in house or not.
In our experiment, representing an idealistic world, there was
no difference in the mean and distribution of quality of workers in
the two categories; hence the impact of historical path dependence
and initial biases could be excluded. Note that signiﬁcant elements
of everyday interactions were neglected in our labor market lab-
oratory. For instance, there was  no recruitment procedure in the
experiment as we were interested in discrimination when hiring
decisions are made. Recruitment itself can add an extra layer of dis-
crimination by selectively targeting certain groups or using biased
information channels. Moreover, in reality, workers themselves
could apply selectively by expecting discrimination. These com-
plications are present in the ﬁeld and would distort the evaluation
of impartiality of hiring decisions in the lab.
Our research questions were as follows.
1. Does discrimination occur in an artiﬁcial labor market with bal-
anced and fair conditions?
2. Do higher quality standards create more discrimination? Or in
other words, if employers are rewarded only for high quality
workers, will discrimination increase?
3. Do worker referrals increase discrimination?
4. Does ﬂow of accurate information in a network of employers
decrease discrimination?
These questions concern primarily the behavior of individual
employers. In addition, we were also able to analyze whether occa-
sional individual biases balance each other out or they add up to
inequality of employment between groups in our artiﬁcial labor
market with balanced and fair conditions.
Hypotheses
An inclination towards discrimination
As suggested by Takács and Squazzoni (2015), who built a simple
model of an idealized labor market in which there was no objective
difference in average quality between groups and hiring decisions
were not biased, a certain level of discrimination could be expected
also in an ideal world with impartial employers. Judgment errors of
this kind could be the consequence of “rational” adaptive sampling
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nd Juslin, 2006; Le Mens and Denrell, 2011; Denrell and Le Mens,
011). That is, people make systematic judgment errors as they
aïvely extrapolate from limited information available to them.
oreover, psychological studies indicated that individuals are to
arge extent also process information inaccurately or they rely on
iased heuristics. They are constrained by selective attention and
end to retain information conﬁrming their beliefs, while ignor-
ng information that contradicts their expectations (e.g., Hamilton,
981). An initial bias with sequential, path-dependent hiring deci-
ions may  result in persistent and self-reinforcing discriminative
hoices (e.g., Hoeffer et al., 2006). These expectancy conﬁrmation
equences have been found in experimental research (Berger et al.,
980; Darley and Fazio, 1980) and are expected to inﬂuence also
mployer decisions in hiring processes. These considerations led us
o formulate the following hypothesis:
ypothesis 1. A non-zero level of discrimination is expected also
n the baseline condition of no referrals in the idealistic experimen-
al labor market.
igher standards and discrimination
Higher quality standards for applicant qualities can originate
n higher need for the best quality labor force, in more demand-
ng tasks, in intense market competition, and in simple greediness.
mployers who have high standards for applicants sort out can-
idates who would otherwise be able to conduct the job. After
mployment, employers with higher standards are not easily satis-
ed and experiment more with new hires. That is, higher standards
re used for selection and also for keeping the labor force (e.g.,
akács and Squazzoni, 2015). Higher standards are typical for high
tatus jobs and for jobs where specialized knowledge or advanced
kills are required. Advanced skills could be learnt after employ-
ent within house, but that requires expensive investments from
he employer. These investments are easily lost if the employee
uits the job. Turnover costs therefore are much higher in jobs that
equire advanced skills than in jobs that do not.
Greedy search (“over-searching”) that tries to seek better alter-
atives than an employee with the quality standard of the optimal
eservation level conveys a loss (e.g., McCall, 1970; Stigler, 1961,
962; Mortensen, 1986). A search that is extended beyond the alter-
ative that is at least as good as the reservation level results in
n expected relative loss not just because of search costs, but also
ecause the average expected quality of new workers is smaller
han that of the current alternative. Extended search and repeated
ailures imply that the higher quality standards also result in lower
mployer proﬁts.
For the sake of simplicity, in our experiment, we assumed that
mployers have no opportunity to train their workers and they do
ot face differential turnover costs. We  were primarily interested in
he consequences of setting a higher quality standard exogenously
or worker selection for labor market inequality.
A higher quality standard implies more experimentation with
ew workers. Information cues therefore could have a greater
mportance for employer decisions. In our experiment, the only
vailable information cue was category membership. Its impor-
ance, therefore, is expected to increase for employers who are
otivated to hire new workers with high quality. Hence, we  expect
hat employers looking for high quality workers consider group
arkers more closely and, depending on available information,
re inclined to develop biased group reputations. The few highly
killed workers whom they are satisﬁed with are kept in house and
ontinue to bias the employer’s judgment about available skills in
he groups. Because of the larger perceived role of supplementary
nformation and the over-representation of skilled workers kept in
ouse for group reputation formation, higher discrimination ratesrks 54 (2018) 254–265
could occur for employers with higher quality standards. This led
us to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Higher quality standards lead to higher discrimi-
nation rates.
Referrals and discrimination
Social networks can be used in job hiring for two reasons. First,
due to its affective content, a social tie creates an obligation for the
worker in-house on one end and an opportunity for the job-seeker
at the other end of the connection. Second, network ties are chan-
nels of gathering, conveying, and signaling information on hidden
individual qualities. Depending on which aspect is more prevalent,
referrals might have different consequences for discrimination (cf.
Rubineau and Fernandez, 2015).
Worker referrals between current and prospective employees
build on the affective content of relationships and are more con-
cerned with the welfare of the applicant, less with employer
beneﬁts. This means that worker referrals do not necessarily reﬂect
information on quality and do not allow the employer to ﬁnd opti-
mal  matches in hiring. Consequently, if considered at all, worker
referrals are not taken into account because of direct proﬁt-seeking
motives.
Worker referrals are based on social ties that are homophilous
to a large extent in the ethnic and other important dimensions
(McPherson et al., 2001; Rubineau and Fernandez, 2013). When
referral networks are used in which ties are typically based on
homophily, they cause labor market segregation (Model, 1993;
Tilly, 1998; Elliott 1999, 2001; Kugler, 2003; Stovel and Fountain,
2009). With homophilous referrals, labor market segregation
develops endogenously even with non-prejudiced agents (Barr,
2009).
Empirical work showed that members of a particular ethnic
group tend to recommend others with the same ethnic background
for a job (Elliott, 2001; Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006). This
can reinforce their disadvantaged position and exclude them from
better jobs (Wilson, 1987). Therefore, the deﬁcit of disadvantaged
groups does not depend on the fact that they would rely less or
more on networks in ﬁnding a job. Rather, it depends on the fact
that they extensively rely on “wrong networks” that cannot offer
them good jobs (Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006; Petersen
et al., 2000).
The characteristic feature of worker referrals that we entered in
the laboratory is their homophilous character with regard to cat-
egory membership. We  assume that their presence reinforces the
initial random delusions of employers about group differences (cf.
Fernandez and Greenberg, 2013). Consequently, we can hypoth-
esize that discrimination is stronger with worker referrals than in
case of isolated, unconnected employers. As we  are interested in the
discrimination tendencies of employers, referrals by ﬁctive workers
in our experiment considered to be a random within-group process.
Hypothesis 3. Homophilous worker referrals increase discrimi-
nation rates.
A network of information ﬂow and discrimination
In contrast to affective content of worker referrals, the ﬂow
of accurate and relevant information between employers about
workers could decrease information asymmetry in hiring deci-
sions (Fernandez et al., 2000; Elliott, 2001). With a correct view
on individual qualities in a larger pool of workers, employers could
arrive at better informed decisions. This is in line with the empirical
fact that recommendations from business partners and respected
employers are considered seriously at job interviews. Surveys of
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ere more important for hiring than objective signals, such as high
chool grades (Rosenbaum et al., 1990; Spoonley 2008: 27).
When employers are isolated and base decisions only on their
wn experience, decisions could be biased in favor of one group or
nother. If additional information is received about the qualities of
ndividual workers and groups, then the increased amount of infor-
ation is expected to decrease the statistical bias from individual
ampling. In order to provide standardized conditions for hiring
ecisions, information ﬂow is considered as an automated process
n our experiment. Please note that we designed our experiment to
uarantee that the information exchanged is accurate. Hence, we
voided the strategic complexity of recommendations in business
ife for the sake of simplicity.
Employers were arranged in a simple circular network. Related
xperimental research on coordination in circular networks has
ound mixed evidence about convergence towards a single con-
ensus (Keser et al., 1998; Berninghaus et al., 2002).
Biases of individual employers favoring one group or another are
xpected to balance each other out at the aggregated level of the
air labor market. Information ﬂow between employers, however,
reates network externalities as employers might be prone to social
nﬂuence. In a perfectly balanced idealistic world as represented in
ur experiment, social inﬂuence (Takács et al., 2016; Flache et al.,
017) and the “wisdom of the crowd” (Galton, 1907; Surowiecki,
005; Lorenz et al., 2011) are expected to drive the group towards
onsensus. Flow of trusted information between employers could
e viewed as an insurance device (cf. Gemkow and Neugart, 2011)
hat bring markets closer to perfection, thereby decreasing inequal-
ty in employment. Experiments show, however, that an average
nitial bias and even mild social inﬂuence could undermine the wis-
om of the crowd (Lorenz et al., 2011), implying that in our case
ocial inﬂuence could enlarge rather than diminish inequality in
mployment.
This led us to formulate the following hypothesis at the level of
ndividual employers that could, but not necessarily translated to
ore balanced employment chances at the aggregated level.
ypothesis 4. Access to reliable information in the network of
mployers about individual worker qualities decreases discrimi-
ation rates.
nteraction effects
Higher quality standards are expected to increase discrimina-
ion when there is asymmetry of information, because employers
re more disappointed with new labor force and rely extensively
n few high quality workers kept in house (Takács and Squazzoni,
015). At the same time, additional and trusted information from
ther employers could reduce this bias and even improve the situ-
tion. This is because employers are more motivated to hire quality
orkers and could overcome their intrinsic partiality for one of the
roups as soon as adequate information becomes available.
For the employers, worker referrals enlarge the pool of workers
rom the category that is already overrepresented. As high stan-
ards increase the turnover rate and employers continue to follow
heir workers’ advices, this could potentially result in a positive
nteraction effect (e.g., Takács et al., 2015). We  have examined these
otential interaction effects in our experiment by the inclusion of
reatments in which a mixture of our manipulations was present.
ethodxperimental design
We  designed an experiment where participants played the
ole of employers and asked to hire workers for their ﬁrm. Par-rks 54 (2018) 254–265 257
ticipants played anonymously in groups of six, with two  groups
playing simultaneously in the same laboratory to avoid identiﬁca-
tion of other group members. They interacted through a computer
network running the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Participants were asked to imagine that they were employ-
ers and were invited to hire 10 workers per period, which
represented one contract year.
Workers were virtual agents and had ID numbers from 1 to 200.
Each worker had a ﬁxed quality drawn from a uniform integer dis-
tribution in the [0,19] interval at the beginning of the game. Half of
the workers were labeled as ‘blues’, half as ‘greens’. Colors were not
related to the quality of workers: the distribution of quality was,
on average, the same for blues and greens. Subjects were not aware
of the exact distribution of qualities. Their instructions, however,
contained that “There are plenty of BLUE and GREEN workers in the
market with a maximum quality value” (Supp. Mat.). In short, sub-
jects were not aware of any initial difference between the workers’
groups that could be responsible for individual discrimination and
such difference in fact did not exist.
In all experimental conditions, participants could select each
worker using one of the following options: (i) hiring a worker
randomly; (ii) hiring a blue worker randomly; (iii) hiring a green
worker randomly; (iv) hiring one of the workers they hired in the
previous period. To allow participants to use (iv), the list of workers
hired in the previous period, including their quality and color, was
displayed on their screen (Supp. Mat.). These options were supple-
mented in the respective experimental conditions with (v) hiring
workers that were hired by the connected employer in the previ-
ous period (information ﬂow) and (vi) hiring workers referred by
workers in-house.
After the hiring stage (i.e., at the end of each period), participants
were asked to provide an estimation of the average quality of both
blues and greens in the entire pool, which served to measure their
actual beliefs and prejudice. We  simulated turnover (random ﬂuc-
tuation) by excluding 10 per cent of workers from the list displayed
to subjects in each round. Excluded workers were unavailable for
hiring with procedure (iv).
Each experiment included 25 periods. The proﬁt of employers
depended on the quality of hired workers, which was  unknown
before hiring except that of workers hired in the previous period.
Low and high quality standards were implemented with the fol-
lowing exogenous threshold rule. The threshold was  = 12 in the
case of low quality standards (−S) and  = 17 in the case of high
quality standards (+S). Thresholds were imperative for individual
payoffs. Speciﬁcally, proﬁt was calculated by summing the quality
of workers with qi ≥ , and dividing the result by ten (the number of
jobs at the ﬁrm). Therefore, quality standards were set up by design
in the experiment.
At the end of each period, the average quality of blue and green
workers hired by the participant was  calculated and displayed with
the number of points earned. At the end of the experiment, partic-
ipants were asked to complete a short questionnaire. Individual
proﬁts were averaged across all 25 periods, with each point being
exchanged with one Euro. Earnings were cashed immediately after
the end of the experiment.
We  followed a between-subjects 2 × 2 × 2 full factorial design.
We manipulated: a) high or low quality employer standards, b)
the presence of information ﬂow between employers, and c) the
presence of worker referrals (Table 1). Therefore, we  included eight
treatments, i.e., four testing for effects of these manipulations alone
and four examining their interactions.
In case of information ﬂow between employers (+E), each par-
ticipant was  linked to another employer in a directed circle network
with six nodes (Fig. 1). Instructions referred to employer network
ties as “friends” (Supp. Mat.). This reference has been made in order
to increase the credibility of information conveyed and to make the
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Fig. 1. The information ﬂow network in the experiment.
Note: No network information was  given to the subjects. Subjects have received
the following instruction in treatment (+E): “During the experiment, some of the
other employers will be considered as ‘your friends’. As friends communicate with
each  other, your friend employers will share information about the workers they
employ. Hence, in these situations, you will get to know the quality of the workers+S  −E +W  
+S  +E +W   
xperimental situation more realistic. In the information ﬂow con-
ition (+E), own workers hired in the previous period, and those
ired in the previous period by the friend were displayed automat-
cally, including color and quality of workers without any error.
he average quality of blue and green workers hired by the friend
as also displayed. To enhance information ﬂow further, subjects
eceived their friends’ estimates about the average quality of blues
nd greens. In the information ﬂow condition (+E), subjects could
lso select a worker who was hired by the business friend in the
revious period (selection procedure v). Note that this meant that
he same worker could be hired by two or more participants in the
ame period and best workers were not subject to competition by
usiness friends. This excluded the possibility that decision speed
ould determine which employer hires a worker with superb qual-
ty. Participants did not know the entire network structure; hence
trategic considerations were unimportant for who could hire the
est workers. In case of no information ﬂow (−E), no network
xisted and none of the subjects knew the workers hired by other
ubjects or others’ estimations of workers’ quality.
In the worker referrals condition (+W), each worker hired in
he previous period ‘recommended’ a friend of the same color,
andomly selected, without revealing its quality. The suggested
orkers were shown in a speciﬁc list on the participants’ screen.
n case of worker referrals (+W), subjects could select a worker
rom this list (selection procedure vi). In case of no worker refer-
als (−W),  participants did not have a list of recommended workers.
articipants were fully aware that workers will give a homophilous
eferral (see full instructions in Supp. Mat.).
ubjects
A total of 144 subjects (56 per cent females) forming 24 groups
articipated in the experiment, which was held in the GECS com-
uter lab of the Department of Economics and Management of the
niversity of Brescia, Italy. Subjects were university student vol-
nteers recruited across all university faculties using the online
latform ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). They gave informed consent. Par-
icipant earnings averaged to D 12.49 (std. dev. D 3.65), plus a ﬁxed
how-up fee of D 5. The experiment, including instruction read-
ng and a ﬁnal questionnaire, took approximately one hour. The
ull instructions for participants are included in the Supplementary
aterial.
iscrimination indexes
We  deﬁned micro level discrimination as the average extent to
hich individual participants hired workers from a single group as
ur main dependent variable. The micro level discrimination index
it takes an individual value for each participant i ∈ {1, . . .,  144} in
ach period t ∈ {1, . . .,  25}. It was deﬁned as one minus the ratio of
he number of workers of the more discriminated group hired by iemployed by your friends and you can also select a worker from this list, which will
be  displayed in the middle of your screen. In this case, you will be able to select
workers whom your friends employed in the previous year. . .”






















where Hit b was  the number of hired blues and Hit g was  the number
of hired greens by participant i in period t. Eq. (1) shows that ıit was
0 in case of no discrimination and 1 if all workers were of the same
color, with intermediate cases of discrimination falling in between.
To analyze whether one group is favored over another one and
discrimination tendencies spread or balance each other, we also
deﬁned macro level discrimination as the objective extent to which
groups were disproportionally hired in the given period. This is
important because, although individual employers might be per-
fect discriminators, this may  not generate employment inequality
if mutual discrimination tendencies across different ﬁrms are bal-
anced.
The macro-level discrimination index t is similar to the micro-
level index but is deﬁned at the group level. More speciﬁcally, it was
calculated as one minus the ratio of the number of workers of the
more discriminated group hired by all the six employers to the work-
ers of the less discriminated group hired. This means that t took
a single value in each period t and its mathematical formulation
was equivalent to Eq. (1) but Htb and Ht g were computed as the
sum of all blues and green hired in period t. As for the micro-level
index, t was 0 for no inequality in employment and increased
with increasing discrimination up to 1.
Results
Testing for pure effects
We  will present our results in three steps. First, we will dis-
cuss results from the no-interaction treatments, in which only one
manipulation was  introduced at once. This will help to highlight
the pure effect of high quality standards, information ﬂow, and
worker referrals on discrimination. Second, we will discuss results
on discrimination from all treatments that included also interac-
tions. Third, we  will analyze employer earnings. Although payoffs
were not essential to our main research questions, their analysis
has important economic implications.
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Table  2
The number of workers hired through different options.
Treatment New workers randomly (i-iii) Re-hiring workers (iv) Hiring from employer contact (v) Hiring via worker referrals (vi) Total (i-vi)
no-interaction treatments
−S −E −W 1827 2651 4478
+S  −E −W 3093 1405 4498
−S  +E −W 782 2542 1155 4479
−S  −E +W 1212 2493 792 4497
interaction treatments
+S +E −W 820 2708 951 4479
−S  +E +W 719 2136 1280 351 4486
+S  −E +W 1439 2043 985 4467
+S  +E +W 745 2005 1209 510 4469
Total  10,637 17,983 4595 2638 35,853
Note: N = 3600 hiring decisions with a maximum of 10 workers per decision.
Table 3
Means and standard deviations of discrimination indexes in no-interaction treatments.
Treatment micro–level discrimination index discrimination index in rehiring macro-level discrimination index
N Mean SD SE N Mean SD SE N Mean SD SE
−S −E −W 450 0.283 0.275 0.013 400 0.367 0.275 0.014 75 0.173 0.060 0.034
+S  −E −W 450 0.426 0.301 0.014 361 0.514 0.500 0.017 75 0.238 0.015 0.009
−S  +E −W 450 0.366 0.227 0.011 402 0.466 0.293 0.015 75 0.322 0.116 0.067
−S  −E +W 450 0.438 0.313 0.015 402 0.516 0.325 0.016 75 0.204 0.031 0.018
Note: The macro-level discrimination index could only be affected logically in the −S + E-W treatment.
Table 4
Mixed-effects regression on the micro-level discrimination index in no-interaction treatments (N = 1800), with random effects for individuals and groups. The degrees of
freedom were computed using Satterthwaite’s approximation.
(Intercept) Estimate SE t p Estimate SE t p
0.283 0.042 6.736 0.000 0.239 0.083 2.892 0.006
treatment effects
+S 0.143 0.060 2.406 0.043 0.150 0.063 2.392 0.045
+E  0.082 0.060 1.384 0.204 0.090 0.064 1.406 0.196
+W  0.154 0.060 2.595 0.032 0.161 0.063 2.552 0.035
subject characteristics
male 0.018 0.036 0.499 0.619
religious 0.006 0.038 0.166 0.868
economics 0.006 0.043 0.140 0.889
study year 0.011 0.013 0.859 0.394






















dF  35.507 
ote: The dummy variable “economics” had a value of one if the participant was stu
The upper four rows in Table 2 show that all available hir-
ng methods (i–vi) were selected frequently by participants in the
o-interaction treatments. Re-hiring of workers (iv) was  favored
o hiring workers from employer contacts (v) and to hiring via
orker referrals (vi). Re-hiring was more common in the low qual-
ty standards condition. Higher quality standards resulted in more
hurn and experimentation with new workers. Table 3 displays
n overview of mean ıit values in no-interaction treatments. All
actor manipulations produced signiﬁcantly higher discrimination
han the baseline (Wilcoxon rank sum tests on individual averages:
 = 83, p = 0.006 for +S; W = 110, p = 0.052 for +E; W = 89, p = 0.010
or +W;  all p values are one tailed).
Note that discrimination index values cannot be fully attributed
o one method of hiring or another as participants could re-hire
orkers or select other hiring methods in every round. They
ypically used combined strategies and might have individually
ompensated for their own bias in one type of hiring by favor-
ng another group when choosing another hiring method. Still, in
rder to see the extent of discrimination that could potentially be
inked to keeping workers in house selectively, we  calculated ıit
alues for re-hires only. Table 3 shows these mean values (see mid-
le columns). It is remarkable that participants were more biased0 8.479 0.001
 economics or management.
in favor of one group when re-hiring workers. The discrimination
index for re-hires was  higher in every experimental condition than
the mean discrimination value for other hiring methods. Although
these factors are intertwined, it is probable that discrimination by
group membership was  more inﬂuential in keeping workers than
hiring new ones.
As our data included repeated observations of the same indi-
vidual, we  estimated a mixed-effects model with random effects at
the individual and group level (hereafter ME  model). There could
be further dependencies in our data as current choices might have
been inﬂuenced by earlier experiences in different ways (cf. e.g.,
Ule, 2008; Corten, 2009). As we  are not interested in the exact
nature of these dependencies, they are covered by individual-
level effects, the experimental part dummy and the other controls
included in the model. Table 4 shows the results of the model. The
positive intercept indicates that a signiﬁcant level of discrimination
occurred in all treatments. Results supported our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Results conﬁrmed also Hypothesis 2, as higher quality stan-
dards resulted in higher discrimination rates. As formulated in
Hypothesis 3, worker referrals (+W) increased discrimination rates.
Meanwhile, Hypothesis 4 was  not supported as the information
ﬂow (+E) coefﬁcient was  not signiﬁcant and, if anything, this factor
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Fig. 2. Social inﬂuence on discrimination in the information ﬂow (+E) treatment.
Notes: N = 1800 decisions. Positive values indicate bias towards greens and negative values indicate bias towards blues. Cases at the zero point are impartial judgments. Fitted



















lig. 3. Conﬁrmation bias in the information ﬂow (+E) treatment.
otes: N = 1800 decisions. Positive values indicate bias towards greens and negative
ended to increase rather than decrease discrimination. It is impor-
ant to note that control variables included in the model, i.e., gender,
eligion, faculty study year had no signiﬁcant effect. We also con-
rolled for a possible experimental learning (or fatigue) effect by
ncluding a dummy  and found no signiﬁcant differences between
he ﬁrst and second half of the experiment.
Regarding macro-level discrimination, index values show that
ndividual tendencies to discriminate have been balanced out to a
arge extent at the macro level (Table 3). The t value of 0.173 in the
S−E−W baseline condition corresponds to an imbalance of hiring
 total of 32.84 workers from one group and 27.16 workers from
he other group on average (out of 60). The information ﬂow treat-
ent (+E), however, led to higher discrimination than the baseline
Table 3). This was the manipulation under which participants
ould have been affected by the selection of another employer. The
igher t value implies that individual discrimination tendencies
uled each other out to a lesser extent. The somewhat higher macro-
evel discrimination index in the information ﬂow (+E) conditions indicate bias towards blues. Cases at the zero point are impartial judgments.
implies that some employers have adopted the biases of or have
been inﬂuenced by their contacts. Fig. 2 displays that while the
most decisions were free of bias, participants slightly increased the
partiality of their decision favoring the group of workers that had
a higher average quality at the connected employer. Hence, par-
ticipants partly adapted their sampling rationally given the new
available information (cf. Le Mens and Denrell, 2011). Fig. 3 high-
lights more evidently that discrimination was  contagious in the
information ﬂow treatment (+E). A larger bias by the connected
employer resulted in larger discrimination in favor of the same
group of workers, and therefore discrimination was  subject to social
inﬂuence in the experiment.
Interaction effectsThe lower four rows in Table 2 show that all available hir-
ing methods (i-vi) were selected frequently by participants in the
interaction treatments. Re-hiring of workers (iv) was always the
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Table  5
Means and standard deviations of discrimination indexes in interaction treatments.
Treatment micro–level discrimination index discrimination index in rehiring macro-level discrimination index
N Mean SD SE N Mean SD SE N Mean SD SE
+S +E −W 450 0.224 0.206 0.010 421 0.356 0.300 0.015 75 0.146 0.110 0.013
−S  +E +W 450 0.413 0.284 0.013 403 0.553 0.336 0.017 75 0.264 0.202 0.023
+S  −E +W 450 0.477 0.334 0.016 403 0.633 0.336 0.017 75 0.198 0.132 0.015
+S  +E +W 450 0.483 0.292 0.014 370 0.592 0.328 0.017 75 0.385 0.178 0.021
Note: The macro-level discrimination index could only be affected logically in the +E treatments.
Table 6
Mixed-effects regression on the micro-level discrimination index including interaction effects (N = 3600), with random effects for individuals and groups. The degrees of
freedom were computed using Satterthwaite’s approximation.
(Intercept) Estimate SE t p Estimate SE t p
0.283 0.040 7.064 0.000 0.229 0.062 3.662 0.001
treatment effects
+S 0.143 0.057 2.523 0.023 0.150 0.060 2.484 0.025
+E  0.082 0.057 1.451 0.166 0.084 0.061 1.379 0.186
+W  0.154 0.057 2.721 0.015 0.163 0.061 2.699 0.016
+S*+E  −0.284 0.080 −3.546 0.003 −0.292 0.086 −3.396 0.004
+S*+W −0.104 0.080 −1.292 0.215 −0.117 0.086 −1.354 0.195
+E*+W −0.107 0.080 −1.329 0.203 −0.118 0.086 −1.376 0.188
+S*+E*+W 0.314 0.113 2.769 0.014 0.335 0.123 2.732 0.015
subject characteristics
male 0.008 0.024 0.349 0.728
religious 0.019 0.026 0.716 0.475


































part  2 
F  144.831 
ost favored option. Table 5 shows that discrimination in re-hiring
as higher in every interaction treatment than micro-level dis-
rimination in general. Hiring workers from employer contacts
v) and new hires altogether (i-iii) were more frequently used
han worker referrals (vi) when they were available. Treatments
ncluding interaction between the manipulated factors generally
ed to higher micro-level discrimination than the baseline, except
hen employers with high standards beneﬁted from informa-
ion from other employers and worker referrals were not present
Table 5). All differences with the baseline (−S−E−W) were signif-
cant: −S+E+W, +S−E+W and +S+E+W led to higher discrimination
W = 82, p = 0.005, W = 70, p = 0.002 and W = 43, p < 0.001 respec-
ively, all p values were one tailed), while +S+E−W led to lower
iscrimination (W = 226, p = 0.022, one tailed).
We examined interaction effects by estimating a further ME
odel. Note that, unlike the previous models, all treatments were
ncluded in the analysis to control for pure effects. Several pure
nd interaction effects were signiﬁcant in the new model (Table 6).
he signs of all pure factor coefﬁcients were positive, which is in
ine with the results presented in the previous section. All binary
nteractions led to negative coefﬁcients but only the interaction of
igh quality standards and information ﬂow (+S*+E) was  signiﬁ-
ant. Consistently with Hypotheses 2 and 3, high quality standards
+S) and worker referrals (+W) increased discrimination. In line
ith Hypothesis 4, information ﬂow (+E) decreased discrimination,
lthough that happened only in conjunction with high standards.
The coefﬁcient for the interaction of high quality standards and
nformation ﬂow (+S*+E) was sufﬁciently large to overcome the
ure effects of the factors involved. This means that in the speciﬁc
ase of high quality standards, information ﬂow actually decreased
iscrimination, despite the opposite pure effects of the two factors.This could be explained as follows. On the one hand, in case of
ow quality standards, information ﬂow increased discrimination
ia selective attention or conﬁrmation bias. On the other hand, in
ase of high quality standards, when available information really0.006 0.009 0.599 0.550
−0.000 0.008 −0.056 0.956
0 105.864 0.000
mattered, information ﬂow decreased employer partiality. This
implies that when there was  a shortage of workers with accept-
able quality, participants have realized the beneﬁts of additional
information and acted upon accordingly to avoid proﬁt loss.
The interaction of high quality standards and worker referrals
had a similar effect, although weaker. Given that there was no
information beneﬁt in the case of worker referrals, an increased
alertness of employers with high quality standards could have
reduced the partiality of their judgment. Our results also sug-
gest that even the mutual presence of information ﬂow between
employers and worker referrals could have made employers more
alert about partiality.
An alternative explanation of pairwise interaction effects is that
information ﬂow and worker referrals offset each other. This could
have occurred when individual discrimination did not have a coun-
terpart in terms of macro inequality and neighboring employers
favored different groups. As the three-way interaction term shows,
this balancing tendency occurred less likely for employers with
high standards, who were pickier in their choices and trapped more
likely by conﬁrmation bias.
Except of the +S +E −W treatment that showed lower macro-
level discrimination than the baseline, information ﬂow (+E) led to a
higher value of t (Table 5). This implies that also in the interaction
treatments, individual biases did not rule each other out completely
in the presence of information ﬂow between employers. This con-
ﬁrms some spread, but not an inevitable dissemination of biased
evaluations in the network of employers.
Effects on participants’ earnings
Participants’ payoffs could be seen as a proxy for the general
efﬁciency in the allocation of worker quality. Table 7 shows an ME
model where the dependent variable was the payoff earned in each
period of the game. Following the observation that higher qual-
ity standards resulted in more experimentation with new workers
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Table 7
Mixed-effects regression on participant’s period earnings (N = 600), with random effects for groups. The degrees of freedom were computed using Satterthwaite’s
approximation.
(Intercept) Estimate SE t p Estimate SE t p
12.388 0.639 19.375 0.000 10.415 0.941 11.074 0.000
treatment effects
+S  −5.659 0.904 −6.259 0.000 −5.609 0.915 −6.129 0.000
+E  3.497 0.904 3.868 0.001 3.671 0.926 3.964 0.001
+W  −0.337 0.904 −0.373 0.714 −0.321 0.916 −0.351 0.730
+S  * +E 4.603 1.279 3.600 0.002 4.361 1.303 3.346 0.004
+S  * +W 2.654 1.279 2.075 0.054 2.549 1.303 1.956 0.068
+E  * +W −0.447 1.279 −0.349 0.731 −0.603 1.302 −0.463 0.649
+S  * +E * +W −2.820 1.808 −1.559 0.138 −2.461 1.854 −1.327 0.202
subject characteristics
male 0.123 0.360 0.341 0.734
religious −0.042 0.393 −0.108 0.914
economics −0.278 0.422 −0.660 0.511
study  year 0.150 0.140 1.074 0.285
part  2 3.218 0.105 30.521 0.000









































oIt is worth outlining that mixed effects models with individual and/or group-leve
epresent an efﬁcient method that can be proﬁtably used to analyze the outcome o
009; Boero et al. 2009a,b; Bravo et al., 2015).
Table 2), quality standards had a direct impact on payoffs. Coher-
ntly with the rules of the game, higher quality standards led to
ower proﬁts. In contrast, the information ﬂow (+E) treatment led
o higher earnings that demonstrates the direct payoff beneﬁts of
dditional available information.
Among the interaction effects, only the one between +S and +E
ne was positive and highly signiﬁcant, while the one between +S
nd +W,  also positive, was only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. None
f the individual variables was signiﬁcant, while earnings clearly
ncreased during the game. This was expected as participants could
ely on a larger sample of workers whose quality has already been
iscovered over time.
iscussion and conclusions
Due to the complexity of mechanisms and problems of their
dentiﬁcation in the ﬁeld, we have designed a laboratory experi-
ent that is meant to test the existence of a baseline tendency for
mpartiality, the impact of a higher necessity of high quality work-
rs, the inﬂuence of information ﬂow in employer networks, and
he role of referrals networks on discrimination in hiring choices.
n the experiment, subjects played the role of employers. Repre-
enting asymmetric information in the real world, subjects were
ot aware of worker qualities in advance and had no prior knowl-
dge about the distribution of quality for the two categories. In
act, worker qualities for the two categories were drawn from the
ame distribution and hence there was no reason for any impartial-
ty in employer decisions. This neutral situation provided the best
ontrast to demonstrate the inevitability of discrimination.
We found that a substantial level of discrimination occurred
cross all treatments, conﬁrming the presence of a baseline incli-
ation for discrimination also in an impartial ideal world (Takács
nd Squazzoni, 2015; Takács et al., 2015). This is against typical
redictions by mainstream economists, according to which belief-
elated discrimination is not viable as employers not sharing false
eliefs would gain a competitive advantage (Arrow, 1973; Aigner
nd Cain, 1977). Accordingly, discrimination is costly: the most
eneﬁcial employment strategy in our experiment was to com-
letely neglect color markers. There is little evidence, however, that
mployer practices reﬂect efﬁcient and rational responses to dif-
erences in skills and turnover costs in reality (Bielby and Baron,
986; Kaufmann et al., 2015). This is conﬁrmed by the persistence
f discrimination in all conditions of our experiment.om effects, although they are not always standard for experimental data analysis,
ated games presenting interactions among participants (e.g., Barrera and Buskens,
We  hypothesized that more discrimination could be induced
by higher standards towards workers (Hypothesis 2). When stan-
dards are set high exogenously, lower quality workers are also
employed by mere experimentation, and hence payoffs are also
lower. Our ﬁndings suggest that higher standards generate a larger
bias and inequality in hiring, conﬁrming previous simulation ﬁnd-
ings (Takács and Squazzoni, 2015). Subjects acting as employers
with high standards relied more on supplementary information
of group membership of workers already in house rather than on
the abundance of information on the qualities of workers screened
before. In our experiment, employers with high standards kept a
few highly skilled workers in house and this biased their judgment
about the mean quality of social categories.
We do not want to convey the message that there is a gen-
eral cognitive bias of human decision makers, which is correlated
with higher desires and more selective preferences. Our results
rather suggest that an unintentional adaptive sampling bias exists
that originates from the over-generalization of the quality of the
small sample of employees in house (Denrell, 2005; Le Mens and
Denrell, 2011). This adaptive sampling bias was more probable
when employers with high standards were interested in the most
qualiﬁed workers only (cf. Polman, 2010; Takács and Squazzoni,
2015).
Considering complex cognitive mechanisms is not required to
account for the emergence of discrimination, although complex
cognitive mechanisms could in fact make things worse (Takács
et al., 2015). The effect of high standards on discrimination could be
enlarged by judgment bias, in particular by self-perceived objectiv-
ity (Uhlmann and Cohen, 2007), cherry picking, and conﬁrmation
bias (e.g., Simon, 1955, 1956). Another potentially relevant mech-
anism concerns expectancy conﬁrmation sequences. In this case,
individuals would be conditioned by selective attention leading
them to consider only information that conﬁrms their beliefs, while
ignoring information that contradicts their expectations (Hamilton,
1981; Berger et al., 1980; Darley and Fazio, 1980).
Previous studies emphasized the relevance of social networks
for inequalities of employment (e.g., Montgomery, 1991; Stovel and
Fountain, 2009; Beaman and Magruder, 2012). Wages, job posi-
tions, or work conditions could depend on social networks (cf.
Montgomery, 1991, 1992; Tian and Liu, 2018). We emphasized that
social network effects in hiring cannot be considered as a single
mechanism. At least two very different mechanisms are at play (cf.
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arket segregation given their homophilous character. Another is
nformation ﬂow about workers via network ties of employers, for
nstance, in the form of recommendations or active search such as
an-hunting. According to the ﬁrst network mechanism, the affec-
ive content of social relationships could create obligations that
ake recommending and hiring friends more likely. This disrupts
he basic logic of a ‘perfect’ market and results in suboptimal allo-
ation of labor force (e.g., Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Tassier and
enczer, 2008).
Our results conﬁrmed that worker referrals increase discrimina-
ion (Hypothesis 3). We  found increased discrimination with worker
eferrals in our experiment, although we assumed no clustering
f worker relations by quality. In a more realistic scenario, where
orkers are more likely to give referrals to workers of the same
roup and of similar quality, one could probably observe an even
tronger bias favoring one group over the other (cf. Montgomery,
991). When contacts are homophilous, referral networks can
educe inequality via an inverted advantage mechanism only if ini-
ial advantage is negatively correlated with the new status value
DiMaggio and Garip, 2012).
Contrary to our expectations (Hypothesis 4), information ﬂow
etween employers increased discrimination. Previous studies
howed that business contacts are important to reduce the effect of
nformation asymmetry and help employers to evaluate properly
he labor market potential of an employee (e.g., Rosenbaum et al.,
990; Uzzi, 1996). On the other hand, in case of difﬁcult evaluation
f quality, networks can enlarge false generalizations and might
agnify the random initial bias. Even unprejudiced employers seek
nd rely on evaluations of others. In case of racial discrimina-
ion, this leads to what is known as racial proﬁling (Grogger and
idgeway, 2006; Fernandez and Greenberg, 2013).
There is empirical evidence that people are largely inﬂuenced
y their social network (e.g., Marsden and Friedkin, 1993) and fol-
ow advice sometimes even when they have direct observations
Sommerfeld et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2009). We  obtained some
vidence that in the information ﬂow condition (+E) of our experi-
ent, subjects playing employers were inﬂuenced to some extent
y information they received. A difference in the mean quality
alues of workers hired by the connected employer made hiring
rom the better group more likely. Participants, therefore, have
earnt from the experiences in their network, which is consistent
ith earlier research on learning in networks (e.g., Barrera and van
e Bunt, 2009; Hofstra et al., 2015; Mason and Watts, 2012). At
he same time, discrimination was probably not fully conscious
nd was not only due to rational social learning, as impartiality
n hiring was often copied from the connected employer. Follow-
ng the preferences of others is indicative of social inﬂuence that
esulted in some bias contagion in the network. Furthermore, sub-
ects could have devoted selective attention to the group reputation
stimates of their contacts. They potentially conﬁrmed their belief
hat had favored one of the groups if this was in accordance with
he estimate of the other employer. Otherwise, if the estimate of
he other employer was not in line with theirs, they probably han-
led this information with less attention. These factors altogether
ave resulted in some spread of discrimination in the network. Indi-
idual biases did not balance each other out completely, causing a
ertain extent of inequality in the information ﬂow condition.
Furthermore, our results showed that these factors interact
ith each other in complex ways. It is important to note that
he combined effect of these factors was not a statistical illusion
ue to the particular method used. We  found that employers with
igh standards have made use of information ﬂow in a way  that
ecreased discrimination. The interaction of high quality standards
nd worker referrals had a similar diminishing impact.
It seems that networks contributed to more partial decisions of
mployers with high standards, who had to be more careful aboutrks 54 (2018) 254–265 263
whom they employ (Takács and Squazzoni, 2015). Moreover, the
joint presence of information ﬂow between employers and worker
referrals decreased discrimination, probably because group quality
information originating from these sources offset each other. We
also found a three-way interaction effect of high quality standards,
information ﬂow, and worker referrals. This interaction could have
occurred because employers with high standards were more likely
to fall into conﬁrmation bias and neglected the more balanced joint
perspective of information ﬂow and worker referrals.
Obviously, our results need to be interpreted cautiously given
the high level of abstraction of the study from the real labor
market. Several important features of hiring processes were not
covered in our experimental design. There was no application pro-
cedure and hiring by different employers took place simultaneously
and was  repeated in the same fashion several times. Participants
were arranged according to a directed circle network and no other
information ﬂow structures were investigated. Workers were not
decision makers, they in fact did not work, and their characteristics
did not change over time. There were no differences in wages and
every job was acceptable to workers. These and other empirically
relevant characteristic features of the hiring process were excluded
on purpose in order to illuminate the impact of quality standards,
information ﬂow in employer networks, and homophilous worker
referrals on hiring discrimination.
Participants themselves playing the role of employers might
have discounted the adequateness of the labor market framing for
the decision situation. They might have perceived the decision task
as an optimization problem that can be approached using a certain
hiring strategy. In fact, this is not unrealistic at all, as many employ-
ees are strategic in their human relations policy and learn from
the experience of others. Conclusions from our experiment, more-
over, could be relevant to contexts other than the labor market.
Quality standards, recommendations, and information ﬂow are rel-
evant factors in any repeated selection task. The same mechanisms
potentially contribute, for instance, to consumer discrimination.
The idealistic conditions in the lab were aimed to highlight some
fundamental tendencies of discrimination that could be strength-
ened, altered, or even cured in a complex institutionalized setting.
In order to understand these aspects better, further empirical and
ﬁeld analysis is needed. Here, for instance, empirical studies that
look at cross-cultural comparisons could enrich our understand-
ing of social and institutional embeddedness of discriminative
outcomes (e.g., Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016; Tian and Liu, 2018).
Providing a ‘clean’ test of certain simple hypotheses while leaving
contextual effects in the background is an important step to under-
stand employer discrimination and explore countermeasures that
could help us reduce these distortions.
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